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The dormant Commerce Clause and state bar admission rules are 
in conflict. On the one hand, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits 
states from engaging in economic protectionism.1 On the other hand, 
states design bar admission rules in large part to promote the economic 
interests of in-state lawyers.2 Courts have nonetheless deferred to state 
licensing restrictions on the practice of law.3 One common licensing 
restriction is the bar examination—a form of economic protectionism.4 
Most states require prospective lawyers to take and pass their bar 
examination.5 Wisconsin, however, allows certain law school 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., 2007, Iowa State University.  
1 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).  
2 Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of 
Admission Rules For Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 146–50 
(2004).  
3 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).  
4 Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer’s Next Hurdle: The State-Based 
Bar Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 249 (2000).  
5
 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2009, 
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graduates admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma 
privilege.6 
Put simply, the Wisconsin diploma privilege grants graduates of 
both the University of Wisconsin Law School and Marquette 
University Law School admission to the Wisconsin bar without 
examination.7 Not only do recipients of the diploma privilege avoid 
the bar examination, but they also incur fewer expenses compared to 
bar exam applicants who prudently enroll in a bar review course. 
Unlike graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools, graduates of other 
ABA-accredited law schools who desire to practice in Wisconsin must 
take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination.8 In Wiesmueller v. 
Kosobucki, a law student at a non-Wisconsin law school challenged 
the Wisconsin diploma privilege under the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.9 Because the activities of lawyers play an 
important part in commercial intercourse,10 the diploma privilege must 
comply with the constraints of the Commerce Clause.11  
This comment considers whether the Wisconsin diploma privilege 
impermissibly constrains the mobility of lawyers in violation of the 
Commerce Clause.12 Part I sketches the contextual background of both 
the diploma privilege and the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II 
reviews the facts, procedural history, and reasoning of the Seventh 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/Comp_Guide/CompGuide_2
009.pdf.  
6 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
7 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
8 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04.  
9 571 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009).  
10 Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (quoting Goldfarb 
v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975)).  
11 See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 923 
(7th Cir. 1994).  
12 Recent law graduates can gain admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of 
the diploma privilege or through the Wisconsin bar examination. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
40.03–04. Also, licensed attorneys who satisfy the proof of practice elsewhere 
requirement can gain admission to the Wisconsin bar without examination. WIS. 
SUP. CT. R. 40.05. This comment focuses on the admission procedures available to 
recent law graduates.  
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Circuit’s opinion in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki. Part III discusses the 
effects of the diploma privilege on Wisconsin and argues that the state 
does not arbitrarily discriminate between beneficiaries and non- 
beneficiaries of the diploma privilege. Finally, Part III subjects the 
diploma privilege to the Pike balancing test and argues that adversely 
affected in-state interests guarantee that the diploma privilege is no 
more burdensome than is necessary to achieve its intended purpose.  
 
I. GENERAL CONTEXT: THE DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
A. The Diploma Privilege 
 
In 1842, Virginia enacted the first diploma privilege statute that 
allowed graduates of two Virginia law schools—William and Mary 
College and the University of Virginia—admission to the Virginia bar 
without examination.13 Initially, many law schools favored the 
diploma privilege as a means to entice prospective students to obtain a 
formal legal education.14 Since 1842, thirty-two states and the District 
of Columbia have granted one of three variations of the diploma 
privilege: a universal diploma privilege, in which the state admits 
graduates from any United States law school; a state university 
diploma privilege, in which the state admits only graduates of the 
state’s law school; or a statewide diploma privilege, in which the state 
admits graduates of any law school within the state.15  
In 1870, shortly after the University of Wisconsin established a 
law school, the Wisconsin state legislature enacted a provision 
conferring the diploma privilege on graduates of the state university.16 
Two different theories have been advanced for this enactment. One 
                                                 
13 Thomas W. Goldman, Use of the Diploma Privilege in the United States, 10 
TULSA L.J. 36, 39 (1974) [hereinafter Thomas Goldman].  
14 Id. 
15 Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 645, 646 (2000).  
16 Richard A. Stack, Jr., Commentary, Admission upon Diploma to the 
Wisconsin Bar, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 109, 118 (1975).  
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theory proposes that Wisconsin sought to attract students to the 
University of Wisconsin who were flocking to Michigan.17 Another 
plausible explanation rests on Wisconsin’s preference for formal 
training over the minimal amount required to satisfy the in-court oral 
examination then in existence.18  
In 1897, the Wisconsin state legislature abandoned the state 
university diploma privilege and enacted a universal diploma 
privilege.19 This provision was short-lived and, in 1903, the Wisconsin 
state legislature returned to a state university privilege.20 Following 
the repeal of a nationwide privilege, law school graduates could ga
admission to the Wisconsin bar in one of three ways: (1) by virtue of a 
diploma from the law school at the University of Wisconsin; (2) 
through the state bar examination; or (3) by proof of practice 
elsewhere for five of the prior eight years in another jurisdiction.
in 
                                                
21 In 
1933, despite opposition from the faculty at Marquette University Law 
School,22 the Wisconsin state legislature extended the diploma 
privilege to Marquette graduates.23  
As bar associations mobilized in the early and mid-1900s, state 
interest in the diploma privilege steadily declined.24 In 1921, the 
American Bar Association formally denounced the diploma privilege, 
stating: “[t]he American Bar Association is of the opinion that 
graduation from a law school should not confer the right of admission 
to the bar, and that every candidate should be subjected to an 
 
17 John McDill Fox, Preface to Carl Zollman, Diploma Privilege in Wisconsin, 
11 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 73 (1927).  
18 See Moran, supra note 15, at 646; Stack, supra note 16, at 118 n.28. 
19 Stack, supra note 16, at 119.  
20 Id. 
21 In re Admission of Certain Persons to the Bar, 247 N.W. 877, 877 (Wis. 
1933) (per curiam).  
22 Carl Zollman, Diploma Privilege in Wisconsin, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 78 
(1927). 
23 Stack, supra note 16, at 118 n.28.  
24 In 1917, twenty-two schools honored the diploma privilege. Thomas 
Goldman, supra note 13, at 41. By 1948, only thirteen schools honored the diploma 
privilege. Id. at 42.  
 41
4
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
examination by public authority to determine his fitness.”25 
Presumably, many states ceased honoring the diploma privilege out of 
a fear of losing ABA-accreditation.26 Despite opposition from the 
American Bar Association, the Wisconsin Supreme Court maintained 
confidence in the state’s two law schools and retained the diploma 
privilege.27 In 1954, the Legal Education and Bar Admissions 
Committee of the Wisconsin Bar Association conducted a thorough 
study to determine whether the Wisconsin diploma privilege was 
detrimental to the training and education of lawyers at the two 
Wisconsin law schools.28 The committee voted in favor of retaining 
the diploma privilege.29 Most notably, the committee determined that 
law school faculty were in a better position to test and evaluate an 
applicant’s qualifications for the practice of law than an examining 
board; that a change in the diploma privilege would lower present 
teaching standards by requiring an undue emphasis on bar examination 
preparation; and that education in Wisconsin ranked high nationally, 
both in terms of legal education and professional competency.30 
Like other states, regulating admission to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin vests exclusively in the state supreme court.31 Wisconsin’s 
diploma privilege remained virtually unchanged until the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court proposed stricter graduation requirements for the two 
Wisconsin law schools in 1971.32 Before the proposal, graduates of the 
two Wisconsin law schools gained admission to the Wisconsin bar 
                                                 
25 Id. at 41. The American Bar Association and the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners reaffirmed this position in 1971. Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need 
the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar 
Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1201 
(1995). 
26 See In re Yanni, 697 N.W.2d 394, 400 n.7 (S.D. 2005).  
27 Stack, supra note 16, at 123. 
28 Id. at 123–24. 
29 Id. at 124.  
30 Id. at 124–125. 
31 State ex rel. State Bar of Wis. v. Keller, 114 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Wis. 1962), 
vacated, 374 U.S. 102 (1963); see also WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3.  
32 Moran, supra note 15, at 649.  
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simply by earning a diploma.33 In 1971, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
repealed and recreated the diploma privilege rule.34 After additions to 
the rule by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1973,35 applicants seeking 
admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma privilege were 
now required to complete the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules,36 for 
a minimum of eighty-four credits.37  
The thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules ensure that students 
seeking admission to the practice of law in Wisconsin by virtue of the 
diploma privilege take certain courses that prepare them to be 
competent attorneys.38 Under the sixty-credit rule, applicants must 
complete a minimum of sixty semester credits in an enumerated list of 
about thirty subjects.39 Further, applicants must satisfy the thirty-credit 
rule, which requires completion of at least thirty of the sixty semester 
credits in ten subject matter areas.40 Diploma privilege applicants must 
complete the mandatory and elective credits in “law school courses 
having as their primary and direct purpose the study of rules and 
principles of substantive and procedural law as they may arise in the 
                                                 
33 See WIS. STAT. § 256.28 (1969) (repealed 1971).  
34 See WIS. STAT. § 256.28 (1971).  
35 Peter K. Rofes, Mandatory Obsolescence: The Thirty Credit Rule and the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 787, 806 n.57 (1999).  
36 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
37 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(1).  
38 Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar 
Exam: A Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 95 
(2007).  
39 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)(a). The subjects are administrative law, appellate 
practice and procedure, commercial transactions, conflict of laws, constitutional law, 
contracts, corporations, creditors’ rights, criminal law and procedure, damages, 
domestic relations, equity, evidence, future interests, insurance, jurisdiction of 
courts, legislation, labor law, ethics and legal responsibilities of the profession, 
partnership, personal property, pleading and practice, public utilities, quasi-contracts, 
real property, taxation, torts, trade regulation, trusts, and wills and estates. Id. 
40 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)(b). The subjects are constitutional law, contracts, 
criminal law and procedure, evidence, jurisdiction of courts, ethics and legal 
responsibilities of the legal profession, pleading and practice, real property, torts, and 
wills and estates. Id. 
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courts and administrative agencies of the United States and this 
state.”41  
The thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules represented a major shift in 
the diploma privilege. In 1971, three other states—Mississippi, 
Montana, and West Virginia—honored the diploma privilege.42 
Admission to the practice of law in these states by virtue of the 
diploma privilege merely required the production of a diploma.43 By 
contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed mandatory and 
elective curriculum requirements on diploma privilege applicants.44 
Quite simply, “Wisconsin has the most restrictive diploma privilege 
[rule] ever written.”45 
Today, Wisconsin remains the only state to honor the diploma 
privilege.46 Wisconsin also grants licensure to applicants who 
demonstrate legal competency through the bar examination or proof of 
practice elsewhere.47 The proof of practice elsewhere rule requires 
applicants to have practiced law for three of the prior five years in 
another jurisdiction which has reciprocity with Wisconsin.48 
Applicants seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar through the state 
bar examination or proof of practice elsewhere are not subject to the 
thirty-credit and sixty credit rules.49  
 
                                                 
41 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2).  
42 Thomas Goldman, supra note 13, at 42.  
43 Id. 
44 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
45 Thomas Goldman, supra note 13, at 42.  
46 Trujillo, supra note 38, at 94. In 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center in New 
Hampshire implemented an alternative licensure program similar to the Wisconsin 
diploma privilege. Id. Students who complete this program may gain admission to 
the practice of law in New Hampshire without taking the full bar examination. Id.   
47 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04–05.  
48 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.05.  
49 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04–05.  
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”50 By its terms, the Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to 
Congress, not an explicit limitation on the power of the States.51 
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Commerce Clause also contains an implied limitation on the power of 
the States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate 
commerce.52 This negative implication is known as the dormant 
Commerce Clause.53 Despite the lack of explicit textual justification 
for the dormant Commerce Clause in the Constitution, the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court on this point reflect “a course of 
adjudication unbroken though the Nation’s history.”54 
The fundamental objective of the dormant Commerce Clause is to 
preserve a national market for competition undisturbed by state 
regulatory measures that benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.55 In short, the dormant Commerce 
Clause prohibits economic protectionism.56 Justice Jackson’s famous 
words illustrate the central importance of federal control over 
interstate and foreign commerce: 
 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every 
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce 
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market 
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
                                                 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
51 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007). 
52 See, e.g., Welton v. State of Mo., 91 U.S. 275, 280–82 (1875); Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318–19 (1851). 
53 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 338.  
54 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). 
55 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997). 
56 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).  
 45
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or 
regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may 
look to the free competition from every producing area in the 
Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the 
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this 
Court which has given it reality.57 
 
Still, the dormant Commerce Clause does not invalidate all state 
restrictions on commerce relating to the health, life, and safety of their 
citizens, even though the legislation might incidentally affect national 
commerce.58  
Consistent with these principles, the United States Supreme Court 
has adopted a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic 
regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.59 When a state 
statute directly regulates or discriminates60 against interstate 
commerce, or when the statute’s effect favors in-state economic 
interests over out-of-state interests, the Court generally strikes down




                                                
61 The burden to 
show discrimination62 rests on the party challenging the validity of t
statute.63 Once this burden is met, the state must demonstrate tha
 
57 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 537, 539 (1949). 
58 Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 306.  
59 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
578–79 (1986). 
60 The term “discrimination” means “differential treatment of in-state and out-
of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Or.Waste 
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).  
61 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979); City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish 
because the regulation, despite discriminating on its face against interstate trade, 
served legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives). 
62 A state statute can constitute economic protectionism on proof of either 
discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981). 
63 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.  
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legitimate local purpose cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory means.64 In effect, the Court applies strict 
scru
t 
 articulated the general contours of the 
nondiscrimination standard: 
moted as well with a lesser 
pact on interstate activities.67 
oved 
e 
                                                
tiny.65 
In contrast, the Court applies less scrutiny when a state advances 
legitimate objectives for a nondiscriminatory regulation.66 The Cour
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local 
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. 
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, 
and on whether it could be pro
im
 
For purposes of constitutional inquiry, courts treat judiciary-appr
bar admission rules as legislation.68 The bifurcated approach to 
analyzing bar admission rules under the dormant Commerce Claus
poses significant challenges to the judiciary because no clear line 
 
64 Id.  
65 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 101 (describing the first tier standard as 
the “strictest scrutiny”); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 
392 (1994) (describing the first tier standard as “rigorous scrutiny”); Taylor, 477 
U.S. at 144 (describing the first tier standard as “the strictest scrutiny”).  
66 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 
583 n.16 (1997) (referring to the Pike test as a more deferential standard); City of 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (referring to the Pike test as a much more flexible 
approach); Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of 
Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 571, 574 (1997) (describing the Pike test as a relaxed standard). 
67 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).  
68 Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 923 (7th 
Cir. 1994).  
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separates the category subject to the virtual per se invalid test and the 
category subject to the Pike balancing test.69 Applying the appropriat
test ultimately requires consideration o
o
e 
f the overall effect of the rule 
n both local and interstate activity.70 
 
II. WIESMUELLER V. KOSOBUCKI 
esire to 
, 
ols, deprived him of 
is rights secured under the Commerce Clause.74 
 
A. The First District Court Opinion 
rce.75 
 
                                                
 
Christopher Wiesmueller attended Oklahoma City University 
School of Law, an ABA-accredited law school in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma.71 Unlike graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools, 
graduates of Oklahoma City University School of Law who d
practice in Wisconsin must take and pass the Wisconsin bar 
examination.72 Prior to graduation, Wiesmueller commenced a civil 
action against the Director of the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners
John Kosobucki.73 He alleged that the Wisconsin diploma privilege, 
available to graduates of Wisconsin’s ABA-accredited law schools but 
not to graduates of other ABA-accredited law scho
h
 
In the district court, Wiesmueller filed a motion for summary 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, claiming 
that the diploma privilege discriminated against interstate comme
Judge Shabaz of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin first analyzed whether Wisconsin’s diploma
 
69 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
579 (1986). 
70 Id.  
71 Wiesmueller v. Kosubucki [sic], 492 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1037 (W.D. Wis. 
2007).  
72 Id. at 1038.  
73 Id. Wiesmueller also named as defendants members of both the Wisconsin 
Board of Bar Examiners and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. at 1037–38.  
74 Id. at 1037.  
75 Id.  
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privilege discriminated against interstate commerce or regulated 
evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.76 








ismiss.85 Additionally, Judge Shabaz denied as moot Wiesmueller’s  
 
                                                
not discriminate against interstate commerce.77 
Having found an even-handed regulation, Judge Shabaz then 
considered whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.78 He 
reasoned that requiring graduates of law schools not in Wisconsin to 
show their familiarity with Wisconsin law was reasonable in light
Wisconsin’s interest in regulating the legal profession.79 Further, 
without any discussion, Judge Shabaz concluded that, based on the 
reasoning in Sestric v. Clark80 and Scariano v. Justices of Supreme 
Court of State of Indiana,81 requiring graduates of all law schools to 
take the state bar examination except graduates of the two Wisconsin 
law schools did not violate the Commerce Clause.82 The
ed Wiesmueller’s motion for summary judgment.83 
About one week later, Judge Shabaz entertained the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss Wiesmueller’s complaint on the pleadings.84 H
found that the Wisconsin bar admission rules did not violate the 
Commerce Clause, Judge Shabaz determined that the defendants we




76 Id. at 1038.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1039 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).  
79 Id. 
80 765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985). 
81 38 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 1994).  
82 Wiesmueller, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
83 Id.  
84 Weismueller [sic] v. Kosubucki [sic], No. 07-C-211-S, 2007 WL 4882649, 
at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 28, 2007).  
85 Id.  
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pending motion to certify a class action.86 Wiesmueller appealed the 
district court’s judgment.87 
 
B. The First Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Shortly after filing his notice of appeal, Wiesmueller passed the 
Wisconsin bar examination; consequently, the Seventh Circuit 
dismissed his claims as moot because the object of his suit—licensure 
in Wisconsin—was now attained.88 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit 
held that Wiesmueller could appeal the district court’s denial of class 
certification, which was not moot because “if a class is certified, its 
members (unless they opt out of the class), and not just the named 
plaintiff, are bound by the judgment.”89  
The Seventh Circuit determined that the district court failed to 
consider whether the proposed class met the criteria set forth in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.90 According to the Seventh 
Circuit, the district court never ruled on the merits of the motion for 
class certification because it erroneously assumed that ruling on the 
merits of the suit rendered the motion moot.91 The Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.92 
 
C. The Second District Court Opinion 
 
Following the first decision in the Seventh Circuit, Corrine 
Wiesmueller and Heather Devan, two Wisconsin residents who 
recently graduated from Oklahoma City University School of Law, 
                                                 
86 Id.  
87 Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 2008).   
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 786.  
90 Id. at 787. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action law suits. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
91 Wiesmueller, 513 F.3d at 787. 
92 Id.  
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intervened as plaintiffs.93 Christopher Wiesmueller withdrew as a 
plaintiff and appeared as attorney for the newly substituted plaintiffs.94 
On remand, Judge Crabb of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin confined the court’s review to whether a 
class should be certified for purposes of pursuing an appeal of the 
prior district court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims.95 She 
determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for class 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; thus, Judge 
Crabb certified the plaintiffs’ proposed class.96 Judge Crabb also 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenge on the basis of 
the first district court’s opinion.97 The plaintiffs appealed.98 
 
D. The Second Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner first considered whether the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.99 The defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because any judicial relief would not 
make them better off.100 According to the defendants, the plaintiffs 
would still be subject to the Wisconsin bar examination because they 
had not completed sufficient credit hours in the specified types of 
courses in law school classes that included Wisconsin law.101 The 
                                                 
93 Wiesmueller v. Kosubucki [sic], 251 F.R.D. 365, 367 (W.D. Wis. 2008).  
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 367–68. The certified class consisted of all persons who (1) graduated 
or will graduate with a professional degree in law from any law school outside 
Wisconsin accredited by the American Bar Association, (2) apply to the Wisconsin 
Board of Bar Examiners for a character and fitness evaluation to practice law in 
Wisconsin before their law school graduation or within thirty days of their 
graduation, and (3) have not yet been admitted to the Wisconsin bar. Id. at 368. 
97 Id. at 367.  
98 Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009).  
99 Id.  
100 See id.  
101 Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 21–22, Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2527). 
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Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument, noting that unequal 
treatment can be eliminated without conferring any benefit on those 
challenging the rule.102 The Seventh Circuit further determined that, if 
the court invalidated the diploma privilege, Wisconsin might instead 
require all applicants to take a continuing legal education course in 
lieu of a bar examination, which would give the plaintiffs most of the 
relief they seek.103  
 Finding the redressability requirement met, the Seventh Circuit 
next addressed the merits.104 According to Judge Posner, “[g]raduates 
of accredited law schools in states other than Wisconsin who would 
like to practice law in that state are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
graduates of Wisconsin’s two law schools.”105 Unlike graduates of 
Wisconsin’s two law schools, graduates of other ABA-accredited law 
schools seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar must either have 
practiced law for five years in another state or have passed the 
Wisconsin bar examination.106 For applicants seeking admission 
through the bar examination, the amount of preparation time and costs 
were significant.107 Judge Posner concluded that the diploma privilege 
rule implicated the dormant Commerce Clause since it influenced an 
aspiring lawyer’s decision where to attend law school.108  
The Seventh Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s two-tiered 
approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the dormant 
Commerce Clause and suggested that the diploma privilege rule 
implicated the Pike balancing test.109 According to Judge Posner, the 
diploma privilege favored the economic interests of the Wisconsin law 
schools; nonetheless, the diploma privilege only indirectly affected 
interstate commerce and regulated evenhandedly because both the 
                                                 
102 Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 702.  
103 Id. at 702–03.  
104 Id. at 703.  
105 Id. at 701.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 705.  
109 Id. at 703.  
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diploma privilege and admission to Wisconsin law schools were not 
limited to state residents.110  
But, the court found itself in an “evidentiary vacuum created by 
the early termination of the case by the grant of a motion to 
dismiss.”111 If Wisconsin law was no greater part of the curriculum of 
the two Wisconsin law schools than other ABA-accredited law 
schools, then the diploma privilege “create[d] an arbitrary distinction 
between graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of 
other accredited law schools.”112 This distinction, according to Judge 
Posner, burdened interstate commerce.113 Because the plaintiffs had no 
opportunity to justify this distinction, the Seventh Circuit remanded 
the case to allow the plaintiffs to build an evidentiary record.114  
Despite the court’s reluctance to issue a ruling, Judge Posner 
suggested that Wisconsin law did not occupy a larger place in the 
curriculum at the two Wisconsin law schools than at other ABA-
accredited law schools.115 He noted that Wisconsin law schools used 
the same casebooks and other teaching materials as other ABA-
accredited law schools.116 Moreover, because no graduates of the 
Wisconsin law schools took the state bar examination, Judge Posner 
concluded that the faculty had less incentive to test them on Wisconsin 
law.117 Citing portions of the diploma privilege rule, the defendants 
argued that the rule expressly mandated that the curriculum of the 
Wisconsin law schools include Wisconsin law.118 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected this assertion, finding no provisions in the rule to support a 
curriculum saturated in Wisconsin law.119 Judge Posner reasoned that 
                                                 
110 Id. at 703–04.  
111 Id. at 704.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 707.  
115 Id. at 704.  
116 Id. at 705.  
117 Id.  
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this interpretation of the rule was consistent with Wisconsin’s proof of 
practice elsewhere procedure, which did not require any knowledge of 
Wisconsin law, and the Wisconsin bar examination, which included 
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and the 
Multistate Essay Examination.120 
Judge Posner also rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
diploma privilege rule gave the Wisconsin Supreme Court a 
supervisory role so that it could assure a curriculum oriented toward 
Wisconsin law.121 Judge Posner found no evidence in the record or the 
diploma privilege rule to support this role.122 He also refuted the 
argument that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, by virtue of creating the 
diploma privilege, entrusted only the two local law schools to prepare 
its students for the practice of law in Wisconsin.123  
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
market participant doctrine exempted the Wisconsin bar admission 
rules from Commerce Clause scrutiny.124 The market participant 
doctrine allows states to engage in otherwise discriminatory practices 
so long as the state acts as a market participant rather than a market 
regulator.125 A state acting as a market participant is not subject to the 
restraints of the Commerce Clause.126 The Seventh Circuit rejected the 
defendants’ argument because the diploma privilege applied equally to 
Marquette University Law School, a private institution.127 In short, 
even in the face of Judge Posner’s skepticism, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to show that  
 
 
                                                 
120 Id. at 706.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. 
125 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).  
126 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 
(1983).  
127 Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 707.  
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Wisconsin law made up a greater part of the curriculum at the two 




The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki is 
important in many respects. Most significantly, Judge Posner 
suggested that the diploma privilege burdened interstate commerce in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.129 Subjecting the diploma 
privilege to the appropriate level of review under the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine reveals that it survives constitutional 
scrutiny. Part A of this section justifies the diploma privilege. Part B of 
this section subjects the diploma privilege to the Supreme Court’s two-
tiered test and argues that adversely affected in-state interests result in 
a permissible burden under the Pike balancing test.  
 
A. The Diploma Privilege and Its Putative Local Benefits 
 
The American legal profession considers competency as one of its 
core values.130 Each state has a compelling interest in guaranteeing 
that lawyers practicing within their borders possess a minimum level 
of competence.131 States can ensure a minimum level of competence 
by subjecting prospective lawyers to high standards so long as the 
standards comply with certain constitutional mandates.132 By 
guaranteeing a minimum level of competence, states can protect its 
citizens from subpar legal representation, as many citizens may be 
unable to adequately assess the competence of lawyers on their 
                                                 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 704.  
130 Sara J. Lewis, Note, Charting the “Middle” Way: Liberalizing 
Multijurisdictional Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients, 
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 646 (2009).  
131 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
132 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). 
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own.133 The power to prescribe qualifications for admission to the 
practice of law has traditionally been left exclusively to the states.134 
In Wisconsin, the power to regulate the practice of law vests 
exclusively in the Wisconsin Supreme Court.135 The diploma privilege 
is an exercise of this judicial ruling-making authority.136  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not expressly address the 
benefits of the diploma privilege when proposing and implementing it. 
One commentator argues that the absence of an express purpose 
behind the diploma privilege’s creation contributes to the rule’s 
shortcomings.137 Others, however, believe the diploma privilege 
furthers Wisconsin’s interest in licensing lawyers—that is, 
guaranteeing that only competent lawyers practice within its border.138 
Defendants in Wiesmueller argued that the diploma privilege was 
designed to ensure competency in the practice of law, including 
familiarity in Wisconsin’s rules and statutes.139 This view is consistent 
with the undisputed fact that only Wisconsin law schools 
systematically instruct in Wisconsin law.  
Even though the University of Wisconsin and Marquette 
University are law schools of national stature,140 the curriculum at 
both schools includes Wisconsin law, not simply the rules and 
principles of substantive and procedural law common across American 
states.141 Indeed, the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules mandate a 
                                                 
133 Lewis, supra note 130, at 647; see also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 731 
(1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (lawyers enjoy a “broad monopoly . . . to do things 
other citizens may not lawfully do”).  
134 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).  
135 In re Bar Admission of Anderson, 715 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Wis. 2006) (per 
curiam); see also WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3–4.  
136 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
137 Rofes, supra note 35, at 807–12.  
138 See Trujillo, supra note 38, at 95–97; Moran, supra note 15, at 649–51; 
Stack, supra note 16, at 21. 
139 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 101, at 36.  
140 See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).  
141 Gene R. Rankin, No. Other States Should Catch up to Wisconsin, 
WISCONSIN LAWYER, Dec. 2002, available at 
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curriculum oriented in both national and Wisconsin law.142 In addition 
to doctrinal courses, students at the two Wisconsin law schools take 
clinical and other skills training courses that incorporate Wisconsin 
law.143 The diploma privilege also encourages knowledge in a wide 
range of legal subjects under the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules 
rather than the limited number of courses traditionally tested on the 
bar examination.144 Significantly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deems 
these subject matter areas fundamental to practicing law.145 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=48646#con (arguing that certain areas of 
the law are unique to Wisconsin, which both in-state law schools emphasis); Eric 
Goldman, Wisconsin Diploma Privilege Ruling Comments–Wiesmueller v. 
Kosobucki, GOLDMAN’S OBSERVATIONS, July 29, 2009, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/personal/archives/2009/07/wisconsin_diplo.html 
[hereinafter Eric Goldman] (noting that Wisconsin’s law schools emphasize both 
national and Wisconsin law).  
142 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2) (“All semester credits so certified shall have been 
earned in regular law school courses having as their primary and direct purpose the 
study of rules and principles of substantive and procedural law as they may arise in 
the courts and administrative agencies of the United States and this state.” (emphasis 
added)).  
143 See MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, COURSE DESCRIPTIONS 2007–
2008, http://law.marquette.edu/s3/site/images/current/courseDescriptions06.pdf; 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Clinical Education & Skills Training, 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/academics/clinics/clinicaleducationskillstraining.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009).  
144 Moran, supra note 15, at 652.  
145 One member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted: 
 
The diploma privilege makes good sense for Wisconsin. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court (in charge of attorney admissions) is very familiar with 
the two excellent A.B.A. accredited schools in Wisconsin. . . . Both 
schools have high standards for admission and graduation. To qualify for 
the diploma privilege, students must take certain courses (determined by 
our court as being fundamental) and achieve a certain average score for 
those courses. In short, we have confidence in the quality of graduates 
from these two schools. . . . Wisconsin should not be viewed as the last 
to retain the diploma privilege; I like to think of Wisconsin as the leader 
on this issue, not the holdout.  
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Judge Posner’s narrow view of the curriculum at the two 
Wisconsin law schools derived in part from the admission without 
examination procedure. According to Judge Posner, the faculty has 
less incentive to teach Wisconsin law since no graduates of these law 
schools take the bar examination.146 However, legal educators prepare 
students to not only pass a bar examination but also practice law.147 
Because graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools often practice in 
Wisconsin, the faculty has an incentive to prepare students for actual 
practice in the state and teach them Wisconsin law.148 Also, a number 
of faculty members at the University of Wisconsin Law School and 
Marquette University Law School formerly practiced or currently 
practice in Wisconsin, and these faculty members likely emphasis 
local statutes and rules applicable to the subject matter covered.149 
Beyond producing competent graduates knowledgeable in both 
national and local law, the diploma privilege also indirectly benefits 
Wisconsin. For example, the diploma privilege increases contact 
between the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the two Wisconsin law 
schools, thereby promoting relationships between the judiciary and 
law school graduates.150 These relationships allow the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court to determine whether the breadth of legal education at 
the two Wisconsin law schools measures up to the court’s expectations 
and whether graduates in fact possess the requisite competency and 
                                                                                                                   
Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, HOW APPEALING, Sept. 13, 2004, 
http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2004_09_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html. 
146 Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009). 
147 Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to 
Pass Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 271 (2007).   
148 See Moran, supra note 15, at 651; Eric Goldman, supra note 141. 
149 See Marquette University Law School, Faculty & Staff, 
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?10927 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Faculty & Staff, 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/faculty/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); see also Shenfield v. 
Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 687 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (three-judge panel).  
150 Moran, supra note 15, at 654.  
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moral character to practice law.151 Moreover, the diploma privilege 
benefits consumers by increasing the number of practicing attorneys in 
Wisconsin.152 Increasing the number of lawyers in Wisconsin lowers 
prices for legal services and provides consumers the freedom to 
choose their own lawyer.153  
 
B. The Diploma Privilege and a Deferential Standard of Review 
 
In addition to determining the putative local benefits of a 
challenged rule, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine instructs a 
reviewing court to apply the appropriate standard of review.154 A 
heightened level of review applies when a rule directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce.155 This level of review is 
known as the virtual per se rule of invalidity test.156 In contrast, when 
a rule regulates even-handedly, a relaxed standard, commonly referred 
to as the Pike balancing test, applies.157 Applying the appropriate level 
of review is critical since these two tests produce disparate results.158 
The Pike balancing test is the appropriate level of review when 
assessing the constitutionality of the diploma privilege under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  
 
                                                 
151 See id.; Bashman, supra note 145.  
152 See Moran, supra note 15, at 655 (noting that Wisconsin has a relatively 
small practicing bar); Eric Goldman, supra note 141 (arguing that the diploma 
privilege encourages graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools to practice in 
Wisconsin).  
153 Lewis, supra note 130, at 649–50; see Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773, 792 (1975) (“lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of 
administering justice”). 
154 See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 926 
(7th Cir. 1994).  
155 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
579 (1986). 
156 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).  
157 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
158 See Scariano, 38 F.3d at 926. 
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1. The Diploma Privilege Lacks a Discriminatory Purpose or Effect 
 
Underlying the virtual per se rule of invalidity test is the 
assumption that the challenged regulation has a discriminatory purpose 
or effect.159 Of course, the notion of “discrimination” under the 
dormant Commerce Clause rests on a comparison of in-state benefits 
and burdens with out-of-state benefits and burdens.160 The diploma 
privilege neither facially nor effectually discriminates against 
commerce because the purported burden and corresponding benefit 
under the rule—requiring graduates of other ABA-accredited law 
schools to sit for the Wisconsin bar examination while exempting 
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools from it—applies to both 
residents and nonresidents alike.161 As the Seventh Circuit recognized 
in Wiesmueller,162 nonresidents may attend one of the Wisconsin law 
schools and receive admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the 
diploma privilege.163 Conversely, residents of Wisconsin who attend 
an out-of-state law school and desire admission to the Wisconsin bar 
must take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination.164 In short, the 
diploma privilege affords no preference to in-state interests over out-
of-state interests.  
More significantly, the diploma privilege lacks any differential 
treatment between similarly situated persons.165 Prior to Wiesmueller, 
no litigant has ever challenged the diploma privilege under the 
Commerce Clause. Instead, litigants relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause and argued that the diploma privilege created an arbitrary 
distinction between eligible and ineligible recipients of the diploma 
                                                 
159 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981). 
160 O’Grady, supra note 66, at 583.  
161 See Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 1107–08 
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that New Jersey’s bar admission rules were not subject to the 
heightened level of dormant Commerce Clause review because the rules affected 
both residents and nonresidents equally). 
162 571 F.3d 699, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2009).  
163 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
164 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04. 
165 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997). 
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privilege by excusing only the former from the bar examination.166 
Like prior challenges to the diploma privilege, the plaintiffs in 
Wiesmueller appeared to complain not about the burdens of having to 
take the bar examination, but about a purported unfair advantage that 
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools had over graduates of 
other ABA-accredited law schools.167 Consistent with the plaintiffs’ 
contention, Judge Posner suggested that the diploma privilege created 
an arbitrary distinction between graduates of the two Wisconsin law 
schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited law schools.168  
Generally, this claim is most naturally assessed under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 Nonetheless, 
similar to the Equal Protection doctrine,170 any notion of 
discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause assumes a 
comparison of substantially similar entities.171 This central assumption 
has often remained ignored in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court.172 Under Wisconsin’s diploma privilege rule, 
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of other 
ABA-accredited law schools are unequally situated.  
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 679 (N.D. Miss. 1974) 
(three-judge panel); Huffman v. Mont. Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (D. 
Mont. 1974) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 955 (1974); Goetz v. 
Harrison, 462 P.2d 891, 893 (Mont. 1969).  
167 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 10, Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 
699 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2527).  
168 Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).  
169 See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the 
plaintiff’s real objection to the Illinois bar admission rule is “that it creates an 
arbitrary distinction between experienced new residents and equally experienced 
nonresidents by excusing the former from the bar exam required of the latter,” which 
“is a claim most naturally assessed under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
170 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
(1985) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means 
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike)). 
171 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997). 
172 Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 298–99.  
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Underlying the arbitrary distinction theory advanced by Judge 
Posner is the assumption that graduates of the two Wisconsin law 
schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited law schools receive an 
equal legal education. However, unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
which imposes the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules on diploma 
privilege applicants,173 the American Bar Association does not dictate 
curriculum requirements for purposes of accreditation.174 Instead, the 
American Bar Association merely requires substantial instruction in: 
 
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to 
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession; 
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem 
solving, and oral communication; (3) writing in a legal 
context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in 
the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing 
experience after the first year; (4) other professional skills 
generally regarded as necessary for effective responsible 
participation in the legal profession; and (5) the history, 
goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members.175 
 
The differences in curriculum requirements renders graduates of the 
two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited 
law schools unequally situated for purposes of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.176 Absent a comparison of similarly-situated objects, the 
                                                 
173 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
174 See Stack, supra note 16, at 128.  
175 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2009–2010 ABA STANDARDS FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2009-
2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf. 
176 See Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 310 (rejecting the claim that the state’s 
differential treatment between sales of gas by domestic utilities and sales of gas by 
other entities violated the Commerce Clause because the enterprises were not 
similarly situated); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686–87 (N.D. Miss. 
1974) (three-judge panel) (holding that differences in curriculum requirements and 
content at the University of Mississippi School of Law and other law schools 
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heightened level of review under the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine does not apply.177 
While Wisconsin limits the diploma privilege to graduates of 
Wisconsin’s two law schools,178 an out-of-state law school could 
conceivably comply with the requirements of the thirty-credit and 
sixty-credit rules and incorporate Wisconsin law into its curriculum.179 
Under these circumstances, graduates of the out-of-state law school 
and graduates of Wisconsin’s two law schools would appear similarly 
situated. Still, Wisconsin could deny the out-of-state graduate 
admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma privilege 
without discriminating against interstate commerce.180 Courts have 
continuously upheld state licensing restrictions limiting admission to 
the state bar to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools.181 The basis 
of these decisions rests on administrative efficiency.182 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                   
provided a rational basis to exempt only graduates of the former from the 
Mississippi bar examination).  
177 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 
601 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Disparate treatment constitutes discrimination 
only if the objects of the disparate treatment are, for the relevant purposes, similarly 
situated.”).  
178 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.   
179 See Stack, supra note 16, at 128 n.63.  
180 See id. 
181 See, e.g., Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding 
that the Arizona bar admission rule restricting bar admission to graduates of an 
accredited law school was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable); Nordgren v. 
Hafter, 616 F. Supp. 742, 755 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that the unequal treatment 
or classification between graduates of ABA-accredited law schools and graduates of 
non-ABA-accredited law schools is justified under the rational basis test since it 
serves the interest of the state in arriving at an objective measure of the quality of 
legal training of its prospective lawyers).  
182 Seeking uniform and measurable admission standards, the Florida Supreme 
Court discussed the rationale underlying the ABA-accreditation requirement: 
 
We were persuaded to follow the American Bar Association standards 
relating to accreditation of law schools because we sought to provide an 
objective method of determining the quality of the educational 
environment of prospective attorneys. This was deemed especially 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court cannot ensure that the curricula at other 
ABA-accredited law schools meet the requirements of Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Rule 40.03.183 The inability of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to determine whether out-of-state law schools comply with the 
thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules and incorporate Wisconsin law into 
their curricula would provide a constitutionally sufficient basis for 
limiting the diploma privilege to graduates of Wisconsin’s law 
schools,184 especially in light of Wisconsin’s compelling interest in 
regulating its bar.185 
 
2. Under the Pike Balancing Test, Adverse Effects upon Wisconsin 
Residents Mean a Permissible Burden on Commerce 
 
Since the diploma privilege does not purposefully or effectually 
discriminate against interstate commerce, the appropriate level of 
review under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is the Pike 
balancing test.186 The Pike balancing test has become the proverbial 
constitutional rule for nondiscriminatory analysis, despite criticism in 
approach and uncertainty in application.187 Both Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas describe the Pike balancing inquiry as a policy-laden, 
                                                                                                                   
necessary because of the rapid growth in the number of educational 
institutions awarding law degrees. We wished to be certain that each of 
these many law schools provided applicants with a quality legal 
education, but we were unequipped to make such a determination 
ourselves because of financial limitations and the press of judicial 
business. 
 
LaBossiere v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 279 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 1973). 
183 See Rankin, supra note 141 (extending the diploma privilege to other law 
schools “may sound easy on the surface, but operationally the process would be 
terribly difficult”). 
184 See Stack, supra note 16, at 128 n.63.  
185 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
186 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
187 David S. Day, Revisiting Pike: The Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 45, 60 (2004). 
 64
27
Huddle: Raising the Bar: How the Seventh Circuit Nearly Struck Down the D
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
legislative function, which the courts are ill-suited to perform.188 In 
essence, the ad hoc balancing approach requires courts to act as 
“super-legislatures.”189 The Supreme Court in Department of Revenue 
of Kentucky v. Davis declined to apply the Pike inquiry altogether, 
noting that the judiciary is institutionally unsuited to draw reliable 
conclusions necessary for the Pike standard.190 Likewise, some lower 
courts echo a similar reluctance to apply the Pike balancing test.191 
Judge Posner in Wiesmueller noted that “[t]he judiciary lacks the time 
and the knowledge to be able to strike a fine balance between the 
burden that a particular state regulation lays on interstate commerce 
and the benefit of that regulation to the state’s legitimate interests.”192 
Pike nonetheless identified three different components of the 
nondiscrimination standard: (1) the burden imposed on interstate 
commerce; (2) the putative local benefits; and (3) and available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.193  
The purported burden under the diploma privilege rule is the bar 
examination.194 Unlike diploma privilege recipients, graduates of non-
Wisconsin law schools who desire to practice law in Wisconsin must 
                                                 
188 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 348–49 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  
189 Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE 
L.J. 425, 441–42 (1981).  
190 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1818 (2008); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 
U.S. 278, 308–10 (1997) (recognizing that “the Court is institutionally unsuited to 
gather facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally 
untrained to make them”); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 
(1987) (declining to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning 
the utility of the challenged legislation).  
191 See, e.g., Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th 
Cir. 1994); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass’n. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994).  
192 571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. 
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 505 (7th Cir. 1989)).   
193 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
194 See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 68 (1988) (taking 
judicial notice that the bar exam “is not a casual or lighthearted exercise”).  
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take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination.195 In addition to 
preparing for the bar examination,196 bar exam applicants incur greater 
costs, especially for those who prudently enroll in a bar review 
course.197 But, does the Wisconsin bar examination actually restrict 
the mobility of lawyers?198 Put differently, does the diploma privile
influence an aspiring lawyer’s decision where to attend law school?
ge 
                                                
199 
The Seventh Circuit previously answered these questions in the 
negative.200 Whether prospective lawyers would attend one of the two 
Wisconsin law schools simply because of the diploma privilege is pure 
speculation.201 Likewise, whether the requirement of taking and 
passing the Wisconsin bar examination would actually exclude many 
out-of-state graduates having a serious desire to practice in Wisconsin 
is a matter of conjecture.202 
 
195 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04.  
196 See Riebe, supra note 147, at 307 (noting that “[m]ost students study six 
days a week, eight to ten hours a day, for at least ten weeks—a total of 
approximately six hundred hours”).  
197 See Association of American Law Schools, Society of American Law 
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 448 (2002) (noting 
that bar review courses may cost as much as $3,000).  
198 See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[a]s we cannot say 
that [the Illinois bar admission rule] is more likely to impede than to increase the 
interstate mobility of lawyers, it is apparent that Illinois has not violated the 
commerce clause”).  
199 See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[i]t is 
enough that an aspiring lawyer’s decision about where to study, and therefore about 
where to live as a student, can be influenced by the diploma privilege to bring this 
case within at least the outer bounds of the commerce clause”). In essence, the 
burden in Wiesmueller was the adverse constraint on a law applicant’s decision-
making, not simply the increased costs and delays of the bar examination. See id. 
200 See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 927 
(7th Cir. 1994).  
201 See id.  
202 See id.; Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 47 F.3d 173, 
174 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting 
that the burden imposed by the bar examination is small).  
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The second component of the Pike balancing test is the putative 
local benefits of the diploma privilege.203 As discussed, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court presumably designed the diploma privilege rule to 
ensure competency in the practice of law, including familiarity in 
Wisconsin law.204 The Seventh Circuit has identified these interests as 
legitimate.205 Despite the deference generally afforded to states in 
regulating their bars,206 Judge Posner effectively placed the burden on 
Wisconsin to substantiate the putative local benefits, noting that “there 
may be nothing at all to justify [the diploma privilege].”207 Only when 
the burdens of a particular bar admission rule fall predominantly on 
out-of-state interests should the court place the burden of persuasion 
on the state.208 
                                                 
203 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
204 See supra Part III.A. 
205 See Scariano, 38 F.3d at 924.  
206 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam); Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005) (when 
assessing whether a statute has “a legitimate local purpose” and “putative local 
benefits” under Pike, a court must proceed with deference to the state legislature).  
207 Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009). 
208 Compare Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–73 
(1981) (implying that the state legislature considered the national interest in the free 
flow of commerce in determining the appropriate extent of the statutory restrictions 
at issue since the restrictions directly affected some in-state retailers and producers), 
and S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) 
(upholding state restrictions on trucks since “[t]he fact that they affect alike shippers 
in interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as without the 
state is a safeguard against their abuse”), with Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm’ n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (requiring the state to justify the regulation at 
issue both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the 
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local 
interests at stake since the regulation had the effect of burdening out-of-state 
interests while leaving in-state interests unaffected), and Raymond Motor Transp., 
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1978) (finding state regulation governing the 
length and configuration of trucks unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause in part because the regulatory scheme provided for a number of exceptions, 
primarily for the benefit of in-state interests, and thus undermined the assumption 
that the State’s own political process will act as a check on local regulations that 
unduly burden interstate commerce).  
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The United States Supreme Court often justifies judicial review 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, even in the absence of textual 
support,209 on grounds that it compensates for a defect in the political 
process.210 Under the inner political process theory, when a legislative 
body enacts legislation with corresponding burdens falling solely or 
predominantly on a group represented in the legislature, a presumption 
arises that the enactment is rationally based, efficacious, and no more 
burdensome than is necessary to achieve its proffered purpose.211 
However, when a legislative body enacts legislation with 
corresponding burdens falling predominantly on nonresidents 
unrepresented in the legislative body, the presumption of validity 
ceases to exist and the need for judicial intervention is greater to 
protect unrepresented interests from protectionist statutes.212  
The political process theory not only solidifies the putative local 
benefits of the diploma privilege, but also guarantees a procedure no 
more burdensome than is necessary to achieve them. As discussed, the 
diploma privilege affords no preference to in-state residents over out-
of-state residents.213 Thus, represented and unrepresented interests 
equally share any burden under the diploma privilege rule.214 
Represented interests—those who graduate from non-Wisconsin law 
schools and desire to practice law in Wisconsin—serve as a check 
                                                 
209 Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617 (1987) (“[t]he 
dormant commerce clause lacks a foundation or justification in either the 
Constitution’s text or history”).  
210 Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. 
REV. 125, 164–65 (1979).  
211 Eule, supra note 189, at 445; see Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 
473 n.17 (“[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the 
[legislation] is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse”). 
212 Eule, supra note 189, at 445; see S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 U.S. at 185 
n.2 (“when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon 
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those 
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects 
adversely some interests within the state”).  
213 See supra Part III.B.1.   
214 See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.  
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against protectionist impulses and assure that Wisconsin sufficiently 
realizes the benefits of the diploma privilege rule, namely, competent 
attorneys in both national and local law.215 Though not a legislative 
enactment, the political process theory also applies to the diploma 
privilege. Enactors of the diploma privilege—members of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court—are elected officials; consequently, they 
are responsive to Wisconsin residents.216 In short, adversely affected 
in-state interests under the diploma privilege rule avoids a distortion in 
the political process, and judicial intervention on grounds of an 
unreasonable burden is unnecessary.217 
The final component of the Pike test is a “means” prong 
analysis.218 This analysis requires courts to consider whether the stated 
legitimate purpose could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate commerce.219 When assessing the constitutionality of a 
statute, some courts have searched for nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.220 In the context of bar admission rules, however, courts 
have been reluctant to invoke a “means” analysis in light of state 
interest in regulating admission standards.221 Significantly, courts 
cannot readily identify an alternative less restrictive than the bar 
examination.222 Wisconsin could, for example, require all applicants 
seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar to take a continuing legal 
education course in Wisconsin law in lieu of a bar examination.223 But 
                                                 
215 See Eule, supra note 189, at 445–46.  
216 See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4; Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 
1985) (recognizing that the bar admission rule burdened residents and nonresidents 
equally, which provided some assurance that the burden was a moderate and 
reasonable, rather than arbitrary and prohibitive, burden) 
217 See Tushnet, supra note 210, at 140.  
218 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
219 Id.  
220 See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’ n, 432 U.S. 333, 355 
(1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354–55 (1951).  
221 See Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1985).  
222 Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1985). 
223 Judge Posner raised this alternative in Wiesmueller. See 571 F.3d 699, 702–
03 (7th Cir. 2009).  
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 70
as the Seventh Circuit recognized in Sestric v. Clark, this alternative 
could easily be more burdensome and exclusionary than the bar 
examination.224 Constant judicial intervention would be necessary not 
only to weigh the relative impact of all available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives of the diploma privilege,225 but also to ensure that they 
were less restrictive.226 The fact that Wisconsin remains the only state 
to honor the diploma privilege does not render its admission procedure 
unconstitutional.227 Wisconsin is free to exercise its own judgment and 




In Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, the Seventh Circuit suggested that 
the diploma privilege restricted the mobility of lawyers in violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause.229 In guaranteeing that only competent 
lawyers practice within its borders, Wisconsin could require all 
lawyers to take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination. Wisconsin 
elected to provide the diploma privilege in lieu of the bar examination 
for those lawyers—residents and non-residents alike—who satisfy the 
thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules. This approach may not gain any 
support from economists. But, a bar admission rule “can be both 
economic folly and constitutional.”230 
 
                                                 
224 See 765 F.2d at 663; see also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We 
Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and 
Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 449 (2001) (noting that continuing legal 
education programs hardly guarantee any level of competence).  
225 See Goldfarb, 766 F.2d at 863.  
226 See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 664. 
227 See S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 195–96 
(1938).  
228 See id.  
229 571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009). 
230 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96–97 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  
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